We develop a model of government portfolio choice in which a benevolent government chooses the scale of risky projects in the presence of market failures and tax distortions.
Introduction
In modern economies, a signi…cant fraction of economy-wide risk is borne indirectly by taxpayers via the government. Governments have signi…cant explicit and implicit liabilities associated with retirement bene…ts, social insurance programs, and …nancial system backstops. These liabilities are large: the amount of credit risk explicitly recognized on the U.S. government balance sheet exceeds $3 trillion, while o¤-balance sheet guarantees of mortgage-backed securities account for another $7 trillion. Moreover, the risk associated with the government's liabilities is not idiosyncratic but varies systematically with macroeconomic conditions. For example, during the …nancial crisis, total o¤-balance sheet …nancial system backstops rose to more than $6 trillion (Geithner [2014] ). And, the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 38% to 72% between 2007 and 2013 due to falling tax revenue and increasing expenditures on government programs that automatically expand during recessions (McKay and Reis [2016] ).
Given the magnitude of these exposures, the portfolio choices made by the government-the set of risks it chooses to bear and the way it manages those risks-are of great importance. A vast literature in public economics studies the costs and bene…ts of individual government programs such as unemployment insurance and social security (Baily [1978] , Chetty [2006] ). An equally vast literature studies optimal government …nancing policies that minimize costly distortions, holding …xed the set of programs the government undertakes (Ramsey [1927] , Diamond and Mirrlees [1971] , Mirrlees [1971] , Barro [1979] ). In this paper, we bridge the gap between these two literatures, emphasizing the ways that government …nancing frictions impact the set of projects the government should undertake. The result is a ‡exible framework for conducting cost-bene…t analysis in a dynamic, stochastic environment, where the government faces …nancing frictions.
In our model, a benevolent government chooses the scale of a program-designed to correct a speci…c market failure-whose social bene…ts and …scal costs vary randomly over time and across states of the world. Our setup departs from the frictionless benchmark, where the government is a veil for taxpayers, in two critical ways. First, we assume that government programs can generate social bene…ts that private actors cannot generate on their own. We think of these bene…ts as arising from a variety of microfoundations: the government has a number of unique technologies for addressing market failures. For instance, it may use price or quantity regulations to correct technological externalities (Weitzman [1974] ) or pecuniary externalities in incomplete markets (Greenwald and Stiglitz [1986] ), enforce contributions to address free-rider problems in the provision of public goods (Samuelson [1954] ), or mandate participation to address marketunravelling issues (Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976] ). Because we take a portfolio view of the government's problem, we model the net social bene…ts of individual programs in reduced form, abstracting from these diverse microfoundations. The second key departure from the frictionless benchmark is that we assume that taxation is distortionary and creates deadweight e¢ ciency losses (Ramsey [1927] , Diamond and Mirrlees [1971] , Mirrlees [1971] , Saez [2001] ). As a result, each dollar of tax revenue the government raises costs society more than a dollar in pre-tax resources, an additional cost that is common across all programs in the government's portfolio.
These two key frictions drive a rich set of intuitions, giving government cost-bene…t analysis the ‡avor of a classic portfolio choice problem (Markowitz [1952] , Tobin [1958] , Sharpe [1964] , Linter [1965] ). A …rst key insight is that programs cannot be judged in isolation. In particular, the government has two risk management motives, which depend on the other programs in the government's portfolio. First, the fact that taxation is distortionary gives rise to a "…scal risk management"motive: programs requiring large government outlays in states of the world where other government spending is elevated are unattractive. The distortionary costs of taxation push towards …scal conservatism, e¤ectively making the government more risk averse than the taxpayers it represents and raising the hurdle that needs to be cleared before the government undertakes a candidate program.
Second, there is a "social risk management" motive: when households are risk averse, programs that generate large net bene…ts in recessions, when household marginal utility is high, are
attractive. An important subtlety that arises here is that the government cannot take household marginal utility as given: by operating large programs, the government a¤ects aggregate consumption and thus household marginal utility. We use the model to provide a taxonomy of government programs that groups them based on their social and …scal risk characteristics.
This taxonomy provides a simple way to categorize any government program and to assess how considerations of social and …scal risk should impact program scale.
A second key insight to emerge from the model is that the government's need to manage …scal risk often limits its capacity for managing social risk. Indeed, we show the social and …scal risk management motives typically pull in opposite directions as we vary the parameters of the economy or the program under consideration. For example, an increase in the volatility of exogenous private income makes deposit insurance more attractive from a social risk management standpoint: the value of preventing bank runs in bad times increases as marginal utility becomes more volatile. However, an increase in the volatility of private income also raises the volatility of tax rates, increasing …scal risk. This reduces the attractiveness of an expansive deposit insurance regime. Since social risk and …scal risk management considerations pull in opposite directions, the overall e¤ect of an increase in volatility of private income is ambiguous in our model. We illustrate this idea by fully solving a numerical example with a single government program: deposit insurance. In the example, deposit insurance is a social hedge, albeit one that is …scally risky: we assume it generates large social bene…ts, raising output during recessions by preventing bank runs. However, deposit insurance also involves potentially large government outlays in the event of a severe recession. The example highlights how the government's two risk management motives come into con ‡ict. Because deposit insurance involves large government outlays and hence greater tax distortions in bad times, it creates additional …scal risk. This reduces the government's desire to use deposit insurance to manage social risk, particularly when tax distortions are large or when the pre-existing …scal burden is high.
Finally, we extend our framework to allow the government to simultaneously choose the scales of multiple programs, making portfolio intuitions even more explicit. We consider an example in which the government chooses between two programs for promoting …nancial stability. We assume that regulation limiting bank risk taking ex ante is a "…scally safe" way to promote …nancial stability because the associated expenditures vary little across states of the world. By contrast, deposit insurance may also promote …nancial stability, but is "…scally risky" because the associated outlays vary signi…cantly and may surge in a severe recession. Since deposit insurance entails costly increases in taxes, the attractiveness of deposit insurance versus regulations depends on the government's other …scal commitments. For instance, if the government is also committed to a strong social safety net, which already requires large outlays in recessions, then deposit insurance will become less attractive relative to ex ante regulations. When the …scal burden is high, it may be optimal to eschew deposit insurance and rely on regulation. These conclusions correspond to the classic portfolio choice intuition that an investor facing a higher level of "background risk"should choose a more conservative …nancial portfolio (Merton [1973] , Campbell and Viceira [2002] ). We also show that when the distortionary costs of taxation rise, the optimal quantity of …scally risky deposit insurance falls. This corresponds to the precept that the optimal portfolio allocation to risky assets falls as risk aversion rises.
Work in public …nance typically considers individual government interventions in isolation, studying the optimal provision of a single public good when the government must …nance its expenditures using distortionary taxes. One strand of this literature studies a static, deterministic setting and concludes that program scale should equate marginal bene…ts with marginal costs, accounting for marginal tax distortions.
1 A second strand studies project selection with stochastic payo¤s that are only subject to idiosyncratic risk. 2 Our model generalizes these classic public 1 See, e.g., Pigou (1947) , Samuelson (1954 ), Mirrless (1971 , Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) , Atkinson and Stern (1974) , Ballard and Fullerton (1992) . This work is recently surveyed in Kreiner and Verdelin (2012) .
2 Arrow and Lind (1970) argued that if the marginal net bene…ts of a program are only subject to idiosyncratic risk, those net bene…ts should be discounted at the riskless rate. Baumol (1968) pointed out that this result is not unique to the government: well-diversi…ed private agents should also apply a riskless discount rate to projects that are only exposed to idiosyncratic risk.
…nance results to a multi-period, stochastic setting with general project costs and bene…ts. This allows us to study how risk, both social and …scal, impacts optimal program scale. In particular, a program's social bene…ts and its …scal costs, including costs of tax distortions, must be riskadjusted. These risk adjustments depend on the composition of the overall government portfolio, and can be large, particularly when the government's debt burden is high. The literatures on optimal taxation and government debt management recognize that government expenditures are stochastic and concludes that the government should smooth taxes over time when there are convex distortionary costs of taxation (Barro [1979] ).
3 However, this work typically treats the government as an exogenously given collection of programs. By contrast, our approach shows that the countercyclicality of government expenditures has important implications for the set of programs that should be undertaken by the government.
Our model also reveals strong parallels between government cost-bene…t analysis and modern theories of corporate investment. In our setting, the distortionary costs of taxation play a similar role to the one that costly external …nance plays in a corporate setting. Speci…cally, distortionary costs of taxation can lead the government to behave as though it is more risk-averse than the taxpayers it represents, just like …nancing frictions can lead …rms to behave as though they are more risk-averse than shareholders. In a corporate …nance setting, hedging and risk management activities can enhance …rm value if external …nancing is costly (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein [1993] ), just as smoothing tax rates and debt management can create value for taxpayers when taxation is distortionary (Barro [1979] ). By the same logic, …nancing frictions have implications for the optimal scale and composition of government projects in our setting, much as they do for …rm investment (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen [1988] , Kaplan and Zingales [1997] , Wang [2011 and 2013] ).
The plan for the paper is as follows. Section 2 uses a simpli…ed version of the model to show why social risk and …scal risk considerations often pull in opposite directions. In Section 3, we develop the general model, and in Section 4 we characterize the optimal scale of a single government program. In Section 5, we explore several special cases of the general model that help clarify the key drivers of social and …scal risk. Section 6 presents applications of our framework to …nancial stability programs. Section 7 concludes.
The basic idea
In this section, we use a simpli…ed version of the model to present the two key insights of the paper: (i) social risk and …scal risk a¤ect the attractiveness of a program and (ii) these considerations almost always pull in opposite directions. We abstract from the complexities of the full portfolio optimization that we highlight in the general model.
There are two periods t = 0; 1. At time 0 a benevolent government decides whether or not to undertake a small project that will have a negligible e¤ect on both aggregate household consumption and on the government budget. The project will require a random …scal outlay of X 1 at time 1 with E [X 1 ] > 0. These outlays will generate a random time 1 social payo¤ of W 1 where we assume the expected net bene…ts of the program are zero for starkness:
The government should undertake this project if its social net present value (NPV) is positive.
The question is how to compute this social NPV.
The most naive calculation would be to say the social NPV of this project is
where R f = 1 + r f > 1 is the gross riskfree rate. Since we have assumed that
we have N P V naive = 0 by construction. Thus, using this naive rule, the government would be indi¤erent between undertaking the project and not.
Our model shows how to adjust this naive NPV calculation to incorporate both social risk and …scal risk considerations. First, the naive calculation ignores social risk considerations by using a riskless rate to discount net bene…ts that may vary systematically with the state of the macroeconomy. Letting M 1 denote the stochastic discount factor that values payo¤s in di¤erent states of the world at time 1, the risk-adjusted NPV is
where we have used the fact that
, as would be the case for a program that generates large net bene…ts in recessionary states at time 1, then we have N P V risk > N P V naive = 0, which re ‡ects the government's social risk management motive. Thus, a government that only adjusted for social risk would always undertake the project.
This kind of risk adjustment is crucial for many government programs like automatic stabilizers and …nancial stability programs because they are designed to generate countercyclical bene…ts.
Second, the naive calculation ignores marginal …nancing costs associated with the program's outlays. In particular, …nancing the …scal outlays associated with the program is costly because taxation is distortionary, and the NPV calculation should take these costs into account. We …rst adjust the net bene…ts to account for these marginal …scal costs, but continue to naively use a riskfree discount rate. The adjusted net bene…t is W 1 X 1 (1 + h 0 1 ) where h 0 1 > 0 is the marginal distortionary costs of raising government revenue at t = 1. Importantly, we assume that h 0 1 is unknown at time 0 and varies across states at time 1 due to stochastic variation in other government expenditures. Then the tax-adjusted social NPV is
The …rst adjustment to N P V naive re ‡ects the expected …scal costs of the program. The second adjustment re ‡ects what we call …scal risk management: programs that require high outlays in states where the marginal …scal costs are high are less desirable. Assuming that Cov [h 0 1 ; X 1 ] > 0, we have N P V tax < N P V naive = 0. Thus, a government that only adjusted for …scal risk would never take on the project.
Finally, we compute a social NPV that re ‡ects both social and …scal risk considerations:
If we assume that Cov [M 1 ; W 1 X 1 (1 + h 0 1 )] > 0, then we have N P V tax+risk > N P V tax . In this example, the …scal risk adjustment and the social risk adjustment pull in opposite directions, and the net e¤ect relative to N P V naive = 0 is ambiguous. Below, we argue that this tension regularly arises in government cost-bene…t analysis: the need to manage …scal risk generally limits the government's ability to manage social risk.
The full model we develop below captures these basic intuitions, characterizing the conditions when the two risk management motives con ‡ict. Crucially, our full model also accounts for the fact that M 1 and h 0 1 change when the government makes large investments in programs that a¤ect aggregate consumption and the overall government budget. By way of analogy to portfolio choice, this parallels the idea that mean-variance analysis is necessary when making large changes to a portfolio. One cannot simply use a …xed hurdle rate based on the "portfolio improvement rule," as we implicitly did above, which is only appropriate when evaluating small marginal changes to an existing portfolio (Perold [2004] and Berk and DeMarzo [2017] ).
Model
In this section, we consider the problem of choosing the optimal scale of a single government program, holding …xed the rest of the portfolio. In Section 6, we show that the model easily extends to the problem of choosing the optimal portfolio of government programs.
Setup
We consider a two-period model with dates t = 0 and 1. For instance, deposit insurance may create …nancial stability bene…ts that raise output in bad states at t = 1, implying W 1 (q) > 0 in bad time 1 states. The program requires government outlays of X t (q) at time t, where X t (0) = 0, X 0 t > 0, and X 00 t 0. At t = 0, X 0 (q) is known and X 1 (q) is stochastic.
The rest of the government's portfolio of programs requires outlays of G t . For now, we take these other expenditures as exogenously given when choosing the scale q of the speci…c program under consideration. At t = 0; G 0 is known and G 1 is stochastic.
We assume that the government enters time 0 having previously accumulated debt D that must be repaid at time 0. Comparative statics with respect to D will allow us to understand how the optimal government portfolio varies with the government's existing debt burden. At time 0, the government issues 1-period, default-free bonds in quantity D 0 that mature at time 1. Letting R f = 1 + r f > 1 denote the gross riskless interest rate between times 0 and 1, the government's budget constraints at time 0 and time 1 are
Here T t is tax revenue at time t, X t (q) is the endogenous level of expenditures associated with the program under consideration, and G t is other exogenous government expenditures.
A key feature of our setup is that taxation is distortionary. Speci…cally, we assume the government raises revenue through an income tax that distorts labor supply choices, creating deadweight costs that reduce output and household consumption. The government takes these distortionary costs into account when optimally choosing program scale.
Since taxes are distortionary, Ricardian equivalence fails-i.e., the way the government …-nances its expenditures using debt and taxes has implications for household utility. Thus, it is natural to allow the government to borrow at time 0 when choosing program scale. 5 Indeed, the ability to borrow in order to smooth taxes-and the resulting deadweight losses-over time plays a central role in many theories of optimal …scal policy (Barro (1979) ). Speci…cally, when choosing program scale q, the government in our model knows it can borrow to optimally smooth the resulting expected tax burden over time, which feeds back into its optimal choice of q.
Here we provide a brief microfoundation for the distortionary costs of taxation. We do so because this common …scal friction applies to all government programs, tying them together to
give …scal risk its portfolio ‡avor. Furthermore, our microfoundation helps link our results to the existing public economics literature. Speci…cally, we assume that households choose their labor supply`t in period t to maximize their period t payo¤:
Disutility from labor z }| { (`t 1 + ) 2 2 = (2 )] + W t (q) + (Net trade gov't bonds) t , (6) which we refer to as consumption. Here Y t is the exogenous level of productivity at time t, which we refer to as the "tax base," t is the proportional income tax levied by the government at time t, and 0 governs the elasticity of labor with respect to t . We assume that Y 1 is stochastic and takes on di¤erent values in di¤erent states at time 1. Thus, di¤erent states at t = 1 correspond to di¤erent realizations of the tuple (Y 1 ; G 1 ; X 1 (q) ; W 1 (q)). The period t payo¤, C t , in Eq. (6) takes a quasilinear form with after-tax income serving as numeraire.
5 By way of analogy, when studying optimal …rm investment in a setting where it is costly to raise external equity but not external debt-i.e., where the Modigliani-Miller theorem fails, it is natural to allow …rms to jointly choose both their investment and their debt versus equity mix (Stein [1996] ). In the Internet Appendix, we solve the model when the government is not allowed to borrow at t = 0. If we constrain the government to choose D 0 = 0, optimal program scale is still be pinned down by Equation (22) below. However, imposing D 0 = 0 impacts the optimal scale q because the inability to smooth the expected tax burden over time impacts the expected …scal costs of the program. Indeed, consistent with Samuelson's (1947) Le Chatelier Principle, which states that comparative statics are smaller in magnitude when an optimizing agent is not permitted to adjust related control variables, we show that the government adjusts program scale less elastically in response to changes in the discounted net bene…ts when it is not simulatenously allowed to adjust its debt issuance.
Thus, Y t ((`t 1 + ) 2 2 )= (2 ) captures disutility from supplying`t units of labor and W t (q) is the additional payo¤ households derive when the government chooses program scale q. This quasilinear speci…cation is similar to the one in Atkinson (1990) and Diamond (1998) .
By Eq. (6), the optimal labor supply when households face an income tax rate of t is t = 1 t , which compares to the …rst-best labor supply of` t = 1 under lump-sum taxation. Thus, an income tax at rate t generates total tax revenues of T t = t` t Y t t Y t , which implicitly links the level of tax revenue T t to the tax rate t . Deadweight loss is created because income taxation disincentivizes labor so T t t Y t . The tax rate that raises revenue T t while minimizing deadweight loss is given by
The deadweight loss of taxation is
as in Harberger (1962) . Naturally, the deadweight loss is greater when tax rates are higher or when the elasticity of labor supply with respect to tax rates, , is larger. When = 0, income taxation generates no deadweight losses.
When > 0, each dollar of tax revenue costs society more than a dollar in pre-tax resources.
The total cost of public funds (Browning [1976] ) is equal to the amount of tax revenue raised plus the deadweight loss:
As a result, the marginal cost of public funds is
In what follows, we use the notation
to denote the extent to which the marginal cost of public funds exceeds one. In other words, h 0 ( t ) is the marginal deadweight cost of raising an additional dollar of revenue via distortionary taxation. Naturally, we have h 00 > 0: the marginal cost of public funds is increasing in the tax rate because higher rates imply greater labor supply distortions. This gives the government motive to smooth tax rates over time as in Barro (1979) . There is a large public …nance literature seeking 6 The marginal cost of public funds exceeds one if the elasticity of labor supply with respect to taxes is negative. In a more general model, the sign of this elasticity is ambiguous. It is the sum of a negative substitution e¤ect and a positive wealth e¤ect: higher taxes make households poorer and thus motivate them to work more. Given our quasilinear speci…cation of the per-period payo¤, only the substitution e¤ect is present.
to estimate the marginal deadweight cost of public funds, h 0 ( t ), with estimates ranging from 0:05 to 0:2 in the U.S. (Browning (1976) , Mayshar (1990) , McClelland and Mok (2012) ).
The lifetime utility of the representative household is
where 0 < 1, u 0 > 0, and u 00 0. When u 00 = 0, marginal utility is constant and households are risk neutral; when u 00 < 0, households are risk averse. Imposing market clearing for government bonds and using the fact that the government's budget constraint implies (Net trade gov't bonds) t = T t X t (q) G t , the Appendix shows that household consumption is
Eqs. (11) and (12) show that the deadweight costs of distortionary taxation given in Eq. (8) reduce household consumption and, thus, household utility.
Discussion of model setup
Several features of the model setup deserve discussion. First, we adopt a representative agent perspective. However, if market failures create scope for government policies to generate Pareto improvements, a representative agent may fail to exist (Huang and Litzenberger [1988] , Du¢ e
[2001]). In cases where no representative agent exists, our framework should be viewed as a short-hand for maximization of a more complicated social welfare function.
Second, the source of …scal frictions in our model is incentive distortions stemming from proportional taxation (Ramsey [1927] , Diamond and Mirrlees [1971] , Mirrlees [1971] , Saez [2001] ).
Taken literally, this means that, with lump-sum taxation, there would be no …scal frictions. While we refer to distortions h 0 ( ) as "tax distortions,"they are best seen as a short-hand for a host of frictional costs that the government may face. For instance, there may be real costs associated with the risk of sovereign default (Borensztein and Panizza [2009] ) or with the high rates of in ‡ation that can be triggered by large government debt burdens, as in Leeper's (1991) …scal theory of the price level. Such costs can be particularly relevant when thinking about …nancial stability programs, as argued by the recent literature on the sovereign-bank nexus (e.g., Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl [2014] , Brunnermeier et al [2016] ).
Third, we focus on a two-period setting. It is easy to extend the analysis to an in…nite-horizon setting so the notion of risk acquires a more dynamic ‡avor. The only take-away from this extension is that persistent shocks play a more important role than transient shocks in determining social and …scal risk. Speci…cally, in the face of transitory …scal shocks, the government can borrow to smooth tax rates, reducing the deadweight losses associated with high and variable tax rates. By contrast, persistent …scal shocks lead to larger changes in taxes and, thus, greater deadweight losses. As a result, optimal program scale is smaller when shocks to either G t or X t are more persistent. Relatedly, we assume that the government makes a one-shot choice about program scale and can commit to this scale in the future. Thus, the model is best seen as applying to non-discretionary programs where, for reasons of political economy, e¢ ciency, or fairness, program scale is stable over time. However, we have also considered a variant of the model where the government is free to dynamically adjust program scale over time.
Fourth, the setup largely abstracts from the fact that government programs may distort the behavior of private agents. For instance, government insurance programs may create moral hazard problems (Baily [1978] , Allen et al [2015] ). Private agents'responses to a given program may impact W t (q) and X t (q) and these responses should be folded into these reduced-form bene…t and outlay functions.
Fifth, while program scale impacts household utility, it does not impact the tax base in our model. This is an appropriate assumption if the government raises revenue to produce a classic public good such as national security, which cannot be taxed. However, in other cases, the social bene…ts, W t (q), may add to the tax base. For a …nancial stability program may help prevent collapses in private output due to bank runs. In the Internet Appendix, we show how to modify the analysis if W t (q) adds to the tax base. In this case, the normal tension between …scal and social risk management is partially alleviated. Speci…cally, programs that add to the the tax base are valuable because they help keep tax rates and the associated deadweight losses low. 
. Otherwise, the analysis is similar.
variables (Y 1 ; G 1 ; W 1 (q) ; X 1 (q)) as given. Formally, the government solves
In choosing D 0 and q, the government recognizes that tax rates 0 and 1 depend on its choices of D 0 and q and are given by
Equation (14) follows from equation (7) by substituting in tax revenue T t from equation (5).
Somewhat more subtly, when households are risk averse (u 00 < 0) and when taxes are distortionary ( > 0), the government must recognize that it cannot take the riskless interest rate as exogenously given when choosing q and D 0 . 8 Household's Euler equation for holding riskless bonds is given by
which implicitly de…nes R f in terms of q and D 0 once we substitute in for consumption:
Since the government's choices of q and D 0 a¤ect aggregate consumption at both time 0 and 1 (the choice of D 0 a¤ects consumption indirectly via taxes; the choice of q a¤ects consumption both directly and indirectly via taxes), these choices also impact the riskless rate.
In summary, the government solves the maximization problem in Eq. (13) where it recognizes that tax rates and the riskfree rate are implicitly de…ned by Eqs. (14) and (16).
Model solution
We now characterize optimal government policy. We …rst explain how government policies impact the riskless interest rate R f . We then turn to the optimality conditions for government borrowing D 0 and program scale q:
The impact of government policy on the riskfree rate As discussed above, program scale q impacts the riskless rate because it impacts aggregate consumption. We have
The sign of @R f =@q is ambiguous and depends on the nature of the program under consideration.
For example, if a program is expected to raise C 1 relative to C 0 , households will want to borrow more at time 0 to smooth consumption, causing the interest rate to rise.
Similarly, borrowing D 0 a¤ects the riskless rate. Speci…cally, we have
When taxes are distortionary (h 0 > 0), borrowing more today lowers current taxes and tax distortions, thereby raising current consumption. It also raises future taxes and tax distortions, lowering expected future consumption. When households are risk averse (u 00 < 0), this means that current marginal utility (u 0 (C 0 )) falls and future marginal utility (u 0 (C 1 )) rises in expectation.
As a result, households want to save more at time 0, so R f must fall.
Optimal government borrowing
With these two comparative statics in hand, we now turn to optimal borrowing at time 0. The …rst-order condition for D 0 can be written as
As in Barro (1979) , the government chooses its time 0 borrowing D 0 to smooth the expected deadweight costs of taxation over time. Since these deadweight costs are a convex function of the tax rate, the government would like to smooth tax rates in expectation over time, even if government outlays and the tax base are not expected to be constant.
To derive this condition, suppose the government issues a bit more debt at time 0 and reduces tax revenue by the same amount. This deviation reduces tax distortions by h 0 ( 0 ) at time 0, which raises utility at time 0 by u 0 (C 0 ) h 0 ( 0 ). Since this deviation raises taxes by
at time 1, it raises future tax distortions by (R f +D 0 (19) says that, at an optimum, such a deviation must have zero e¤ect on expected lifetime utility.
When there are no …scal frictions (h 0 = 0), only the scale of the government program (q) impacts household welfare. Ricardian equivalence holds, so the mix of debt and taxes used to …nance expenditures is irrelevant, and D 0 is not pinned down (Barro [1974] ).
Optimal program scale
We now turn to the optimal scale of the program. The …rst-order condition for q is given by
We can write the e¤ect of changing q on household consumption at times 0 and 1 as:
Increasing program scale directly alters time t consumption by W 0 t (q) X 0 t (q) and increases the deadweight loss from distortionary taxation by h 0 ( t ) X 0 t (q). There is an additional term at time
, re ‡ecting the fact that the choice of q a¤ects the interest rate R f and thus required tax revenue at time 1.
Thus, the optimal amount of government activity satis…es
Proposition 1 An optimum is a pair (D 0 ; q ) such that D 0 and q satisfy Eqs. (19) and (22), and where 0 ; 1 , and R f are implicitly de…ned by Eqs. (14) and (16).
Proof. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
A decomposition of the condition for optimal program scale
To interpret the …rst-order condition in Eq. (22), let
denote the representative household's stochastic discount factor, which follows by substituting C t in Eq. (12) into the standard de…nition of the stochastic discount factor
In the Appendix we show that the optimal scale of the government program satis…es
Expected …scal cost
Interaction between social and …scal risk .
Before interpreting the …ve terms in Eq. (24) we …rst note that certain terms disappear in di¤erent limiting cases. First, if there is no uncertainty about the state of the world at t = 1, the third, fourth, and …fth terms are zero. 9 Second, if households are risk neutral (u 00 = 0),
is constant and the third and …fth terms are zero. Third, if there are no tax distortions (h 0 = 0), the second, fourth, and …fth terms are zero.
We now interpret the …ve terms in Eq. (24) (10) and (14)). This e¤ect can be ignored when considering small programs within the government's portfolio, but not large programs.
The third term in Eq. (24) re ‡ects the government's social risk management motive. When households are risk averse (u 00 < 0), the government wants to undertake more of a program if its net bene…ts tend to accrue in bad time 1 states when household marginal utility is high-
By contrast, there is no social risk management motive if households are risk neutral (u 00 = 0).
11
Again, a critical point about this social risk management term is that the stochastic discount factor M 1 itself depends on the scale of the government program q (see Eq. (23)). Government projects have the potential to alter aggregate consumption and therefore cannot be treated as "marginal," a point …rst noted by Dasgupta, Sen, and Marglin (1972) , Little and Mirrlees (1974) , and recently emphasized by Martin and Pindyck (2015) . As above, this complication can be safely ignored for small programs, but not large programs. For instance, if government policies reduce the volatility of aggregate consumption and hence marginal utility, risk premia will be smaller than they would in the corresponding economy where q = 0. Thus, the existence of government programs may alter household attitudes towards risky projects, including government programs. As discussed below, this also means that changes in the parameters governing a particular government program have both substitution and income e¤ects, leading to ambiguous comparative statics.
The fourth term in Eq. (24) As we emphasize below, the social risk management motive captured by the third term in (24) and the …scal risk management motive captured by the fourth term often con ‡ict. Programs like deposit insurance and automatic stabilizers, which may have signi…cant social risk management bene…ts, tend to involve government outlays and, hence, higher tax distortions in bad times, creating greater …scal risk. Thus, when evaluating a large government program, the third and fourth terms in Eq. (24) will often pull in opposite directions.
The …nal term in Eq. (24),
, is the risk premium stemming from the cyclicality of taxes and re ‡ects the interaction between the government's social and …scal risk management motives. Speci…cally, if a program leads to increased taxes in bad times, tax distortions reduce private consumption precisely when it is most valuable, leading the 11 In contrast to U.S. budgeting procedures, economists have frequently argued-see Lucas (2012) . This taxonomy highlights the value of our general framework, and sheds light on how di¤erent programs …t into the government's portfolio.
To be clear, our goal in this section is not to argue that there is necessarily a strong economic rationale for individual programs. Instead, we simply use our framework to highlight whether considerations related to social risk or …scal risk are likely to play an important role in a comprehensive analysis of each program.
Neither social nor …scal risk are important
A …rst set of programs are those with neither social risk nor …scal risk (i.e.,
. In this case, only the …rst two terms in Eq. (24) will be important. Programs in this category arguably include government insurance protection for ‡oods, terrorism, and crop failures, regulations for food and drug safety, and federal subsidies for basic research and education.
Turning …rst to insurance for ‡oods, terrorism, and crop failures, it is sometimes argued that government involvement in these insurance markets is necessary because large disasters can severely impair private insurers'capital. Because private insurers face …nancing frictions, it can then be di¢ cult for customers to purchase new insurance following disasters (Anderson [1974] , Gollier [1997] , Froot [2001] , Froot and O'Connell [2008] , and Nguyen [2012] ). If the government faces smaller …nancing frictions than private insurers, government involvement might provide risk-sharing bene…ts to individual households and …rms. However, the incidences and severities of ‡oods, terrorist attacks, and crop failures are likely to be largely uncorrelated with the broader macroeconomy, so social risk considerations are unlikely to play an important role in an analysis of these programs. Similarly, the …scal costs of these insurance programs are largely uncorrelated with the outlays for other government programs, so …scal risk considerations should be relatively unimportant.
Regulations like food and drug safety standards are also arguably neither socially nor …scally risky. These programs may provide social bene…ts by alleviating asymmetric information problems between customers and …rms (Akerlof [1970] , Henson and Traill [1993] ), bene…ts which are likely to be relatively acyclical. And the …scal costs of providing inspections and oversight are relatively constant and, thus, unlikely to covary with the outlays on other government programs.
Similarly, public …nancing for basic scienti…c research and education is arguably to a …rst order neither socially nor …scally risky. The case for these programs is that knowledge is a public good, so the returns to producing it (research) or acquiring it (education) do not accrue solely to the agent making the investment, leading to private underinvestment relative to the …rst best (Nelson [1959] , Arrow [1962] , Stiglitz [1999] , Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein [2008] ). Again, these programs likely have relatively constant costs and bene…ts that do not meaningfully covary with the state of the economy, making social and …scal risk considerations fairly minor.
Social risk is important, but …scal risk is not
A second set of programs are those for which there are important social risk considerations, but where …scal risk is minimal (i.e.,
, so only the …rst three terms in Eq. (24) will be important. Ex ante …nancial regulations aimed at promoting the stability of the …nancial system-including bank examinations, bank capital requirements, and bank liquidity requirements-arguably fall into this category. The social bene…ts of these …nancial regulations-preventing costly bank runs that would otherwise occur-are likely to accrue during recessions when household marginal utility is high (Calomiris and Gorton [1990] ). However, the government outlays associated with these regulations-the costs of conducting bank examinations and monitoring compliance with capital and liquidity requirements-are likely fairly constant over time and across states and, thus, are unlikely to covary with expenditures on other programs.
Fiscal risk is important, but social risk is not
A third set of programs are those for which there are no social risk considerations, but where there
We have not been able to think of any programs that are likely to fall into this bucket.
Both social and …scal risk are important
The …nal set of programs are those with both important …scal and social risk considerations (i.e., Social insurance programs fall into this category. The social value of unemployment insurance is arguably high in recessions because aggregate insurance payments rise when marginal utility is high Saez [2016, 2017] ). However, unemployment insurance programs are likely to be …scally risky: when unemployment insurance payments are high, other government expenditures are likely to be high (Musgrave and Miller [1948] , Auerbach and Feenberg [2000] , McKay and Reis [2016] ).
Similarly, …nancial stability programs like bank debt guarantees arguably fall into this bucket.
The social value of preventing the output loss associated with bank runs primarily accrues in recessions, so these programs are social hedges. However, the outlays associated with debt guarantee programs are likely to be high at times when other government outlays are elevated.
Countercyclical stimulus programs would also fall into this group. The textbook Keynesian view is that, due to sticky nominal prices and wages, declines in aggregate demand lead output and employment to fall below their potential under ‡exible prices (Samuelson [1947 ], Romer [2001 ). The traditional view is that, when output is below potential, the government should invest in "shovel-ready"public projects to stimulate aggregate demand, thus pushing the economy closer to the …rst-best outcome under ‡exible prices. In this view, countercyclical Keynesian stimulus programs are a …scally risky, social hedge.
What these programs have in common is that they generate social bene…ts through the use of transfer payments. Since the need for these transfer payments is countercyclical, the programs are social hedges but are …scally risky. And because many government programs share this feature, total government expenditures will tend to rise in bad times. Formally, these programs have the features that (i)
they are social hedges and (ii)
, the net bene…ts are correlated with outlays. Since many government programs have these features, it will then typically be the case that
, these programs will be …scally risky. This logic also shows why it is hard to have programs that are both social and …scal hedges. Since most social hedges (i.e., programs where
, it is hard for any of them to also have the feature that Cov [h 0 ( 1 ) ; X 0 1 (q)] < 0: However, there are socially risky programs that are …scal hedges. Any public good that is utilized more heavily in expansions than recessions will be "socially risky" in the sense that its net bene…ts primarily accrue in good times. For instance, the improvement in output associated with the interstate highway system is arguably procyclical. In addition, except for the Keynesian stimulus discussed above, outlays for these public goods are also likely to be procyclical: roads are mostly built and maintained in good times. Since outlays tend to occur in economic expansions where the overall …scal burden is low, these programs may be …scal hedges.
Overall, this discussion highlights the value of our general framework for cost-bene…t analysis.
The framework allows one to understand how di¤erent programs should …t into the government's portfolio and how social and …scal risk considerations in ‡uence optimal program scale. Furthermore, we argue that many large government programs fall in the …nal bucket and have the feature that social and …scal risk management considerations tend to pull in opposite directions.
Determinants of social and …scal risk
In this section, we explore how the characteristics of an individual program, the rest of the government's portfolio, and the broader macroeconomy a¤ect considerations of social and …scal risk. To develop these intuitions, we compute approximate solutions to the government's problem.
We then compute comparative statics to highlight the determinants of social and …scal risk.
Approximate …rst-order conditions
We replace the government's two key …rst-order conditions with Taylor series approximations about the expansion point (C t ; Y t ; T t ) = C; Y ; T . We assume that the government program has constant returns to scale so that W t (q) = qW t and X t (q) = qX t .
Speci…cally, as shown in the Appendix, we have h 0 ( t ) h 0 + T =Y T t =T Y t =Y and u 0 (C t ) 1 C t C where u 00 (C)=u 0 (C) 0 denotes the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion at C. Using these approximations, we can replace the optimality condition for D 0 in Eq. (19) with the approximate condition
is an approximation to consumption, and ; h 0 , ,^ Y , D 0 , andR f are constants given in the Appendix (when = 0, h 0 = =^ Y = D 0 = 0). Similarly, we replace the optimality condition for q in Eq. (22) with the approximate condition
where q is a constant given in the Appendix (when = 0 , q = 0).
Eqs. (25) and (27) are a system of two quadratic equations in D 0 and q that can be solved in closed form to obtain optimal policies. When > 0 and > 0, this system reduces to a quartic in q that can be solved analytically. With either (i) risk-neutral households and tax distortions ( = 0 and > 0) or (ii) risk-averse households and no tax distortions ( > 0 and = 0), we obtain a system of two linear equations in D 0 and q. We use these two limiting cases below to show how risk aversion and tax distortions impact optimal program scale.
Risk-neutral households and tax distortions ( = 0 and > 0)
We …rst consider the case where households are risk-neutral ( = 0), but government taxation is distortionary ( > 0). This case, where the government seeks to generate net bene…ts for households while limiting expected …scal costs and …scal risk, allows us to identify the key determinants of these …scal considerations.
When = 0 and > 0, the approximate …rst-order condition for D 0 in (25) collapses to
which says that government borrowing is chosen to smooth expected tax rates over time. As shown in the Appendix, in this case Eqs. (25) and (27) form a system of two linear equations in D 0 and q that can be solved to obtain:
(1 + )
The …rst term in Eq. (29) is proportional to the program's expected marginal net bene…t,
The denominator of this term is the direct deadweight costs from increasing program expenditures at the margin. These costs are increasing in the program's expected outlays, the variability of the program's outlays, and the e¤ective degree of "…scal risk aversion", =Y , which is increasing in the labor supply elasticity with respect to the tax rate ( ) and decreasing in the tax base (Y ).
The second term in (29) is proportional to the expected …scal costs of the program that arise in the presence of other government expenditures. Speci…cally, the numerator of the second term is equal to expected discounted marginal outlays (i.e., X 0 + E [X 1 ]) times the expected marginal deadweight cost of taxation when q = 0.
The third term re ‡ects the government's …scal risk management motive and captures the additional deadweight costs that arise if time 1 spending on the program covaries positively with time 1 tax rates. Naturally, this covariance is higher when Cov [G 1 ; X 1 ] is larger or when
The next proposition provides a set of intuitive comparative statics, showing how the optimal scale of the project q depends on the exogenous parameters of the model.
Proposition 2 Consider the case with risk-neutral households ( = 0) and distortionary taxa-
, and q > 0. Then we have the following comparative statics for optimal program scale: Similar logic applies to the e¤ect of the severity of marginal tax distortions, . @q =@ is
, so an increase in , which increases the deadweight loss of taxation, leads the government to cut back on attractive projects with large discounted net bene…ts. When the preexisting debt burden D is high, the government should cut back on programs, particularly those with the largest expected outlays. In addition, all else equal, the government should choose a smaller scale for programs whose outlays are more variable. Finally, the government should choose a smaller scale for programs whose outlays covary positively with other spending (G 1 ) or negatively with the tax base (Y 1 ).
Risk-averse households and no tax distortions ( > 0 and = 0)
We next consider the case where households are risk-averse ( > 0) and there are no tax distortions ( = 0). This case, where the government seeks to generate net bene…ts for households and to manage social risk, allows us to identify the key drivers of social risk in the model. In this case Ricardian equivalence holds, and the level of debt is not pinned down at the optimum. The approximate solution for optimal program scale is:
The numerator of the …rst term in Eq. the government likes programs that hedge against exogenous shocks, both those emanating from the private economy (Y 1 ) and those emanating from other government expenditures (G 1 ).
, and q > 0. Then we have the following comparative statics for optimal program scale: In this Ricardian case, comparative statics with respect to the W s and Xs are generally ambiguous due to competing substitution and income e¤ects. For instance, the impact of program net bene…ts at time 0 on optimal scale is @q =@ (
is ambiguous. Holding marginal utility …xed, an increase in (W 0 X 0 ) leads to a substitution e¤ect that makes the government want to do more of the program. But there is a competing income e¤ect: the increase in (W 0 X 0 ) reduces marginal utility and lowers the government's willingness to pay, pushing it to do less of the program.
In contrast, as the proposition states, comparative statics with respect to the Y s and Gs will be unambiguous because they only involve income e¤ects, which alter the government's willingness to pay for a particular program. For instance, we have @q =@Y 0 < 0 because the increase in Y 0 reduces marginal utility and lowers the government's willingness to pay, pushing it to do less of the program. In addition, @q =@ is proportional to
so an increase in risk aversion leads the government to cut back on attractive projects with large discounted net bene…ts.
Risk-averse households and tax distortions ( > 0 and > 0)
The approximate solution in the general case where > 0 and > 0 mixes the intuitions derived in the past two sections. In addition, analytically solving the system of two quadratic equations in q and D 0 given by Eqs. (25) and (27) is unwieldy and adds little additional insight. Thus, to explore the interactions of social and …scal risk in the general case where > 0 and > 0, we use numerical solutions below.
Applications

Single program: Government guarantees of bank debt
In this section, we provide a full analysis of a single government program within our framework.
We start with a microfoundation, then embed the program within our framework, and compute numerical comparative statics in the general case where > 0 and > 0:
Our example builds on Stein (2012) and Hanson, Shleifer, Stein, and Vishny (2015) and considers the value of policies to prevent economically destabilizing bank runs. In these models, banks hold long-term risky assets, which they …nance by issuing equity and short-term debt.
Households assign a special value to short-term bank debt because it is completely safe, but issuing uninsured short-term debt means that banks may be forced to liquidate assets in an economic downturn. These …re sales are costly for society because other savers use their scarce capital to purchase liquidated assets, instead of investing in new real projects. Since the uninsured depositors who withdraw funds from banks do not have access to the same investment opportunities, these …re sales reduce real investment. Because banks do not fully internalize these costs of short-term debt …nancing, there is scope for welfare-improving government intervention.
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[ Figure 1 here]
Our example, depicted in Figure 1 , formalizes this intuition. There are two periods t = 0 and t = 1 where payo¤s to households are realized. In addition, there is an interim period t = 1=2
where news arrives, but no payo¤s are realized. At t = 0 households derive special monetary services from holding bank debt that is completely safe. With probability good news arrives at t = 1=2 and agents learn that there will be an economic expansion at t = 1 and bank assets will perform well (call this state s = H). With probability 1 agents receive bad news at t = 1=2. If there is bad news at t = 1=2, then with probability there is a moderate recession at t = 1 and bank assets will su¤er moderate losses (state s = LH). With probability (1 )
there will be a severe recession at t = 1 and bank assets will be worthless (state s = LL). Thus, there are three possible states at time 1, s 2 fH; LH; LLg, with probabilities Pr (s = H) = , Pr (s = LH) = (1 ) , and Pr (s = LL) = (1 ) (1 ).
There are two technologies for making bank debt completely safe. First, banks can issue uninsured debt which is made safe by liquidating bank assets if bad news arrives at t = 1=2.
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Second, the government can insure bank debt, covering any realized shortfall between the value of bank assets and insured debt. In order to issue insured deposits, we assume the government requires banks to have enough equity capital to absorb the mild losses that arise if there is a moderate recession at time 1 (s = LH). Thus, the government guarantee program only covers the shortfall that arises if there is a severe recession at time 1 (s = LL). Total safe bank debt 12 Of course, there are other reasons that …re sales may be costly to the economy (e.g., Diamond and Rajan 2011) . The example we provide here is illustrative. 13 If banks issue uninsured debt and there is bad news at t = 1=2, they must liquidate assets to ensure that the debt remains completely safe. Bank assets still have a positive value at t = 1=2 since with probability the recession will be mild and the losses on assets will also be mild. However, the assets cannot support any amount of completely safe debt since with probability 1 there will be a severe depression and the assets will be worth 0. Thus, to keep their uninsured debt completely safe, banks must liquidate assets following bad news at t = 1=2.
is M = M U + M I where M U is uninsured debt and M I = m I q is amount of bank debt that is insured by the government. Here m I > 0 and q is the scale of the government's guarantee program. For simplicity, we assume that M is …xed, so an expansion of government guaranteed debt crowds out uninsured debt one-for-one. Thus, the monetary services households enjoy from holding bank debt are …xed; the only question is how this debt is made safe.
Issuing uninsured bank debt is social costly because it may necessitate asset liquidations at t = 1 that lead to a decline in real investment. Speci…cally, we assume that real investment at t = 1 in state H is K, where K is some exogenous amount of savings at t = 1. The net social returns to investment are f K K, where f > 1 is a constant. By contrast, if there is bad news at t = 1=2, then real investment is K M U = K M + m I q. Real investment falls because (i) other savers forgo productive real investments to purchase liquidated bank assets and (ii) the depositors who withdraw funds from the bank do not have access to these same projects. Thus, the net returns to investment following bad news at t = 1=2-in both states LH and LL-is
which is increasing in q, the scale of the government's guarantee program.
If banks issue guaranteed debt, there are no such liquidations and investment is higher. Thus, the gross social bene…t of having a guarantee program of scale q is that consumption is higher by W 1;LH (q) = (f 1) m I q in state LH and W 1;LL (q) = f m I q in state LL. (There are no social bene…ts of guarantees in state H: W 1;H (q) = 0). The …scal costs of guarantees stem from the fact that the government has to make outlays X 1;LL (q) = m I q to pay o¤ the guaranteed debt in the severe recessionary state LL. (Government outlays are X 1;H (q) = X 1;LH (q) = 0 in states H and LH because bank assets perform well enough so banks can fully repay the debt.)
In summary, an expansion of the debt guarantee program raises investment in both states LH and LL, but creates costly …scal distortions in state LL. We can write the social bene…ts and …scal costs of this debt guarantee program at time 1 as W 1s (q) = W 1s q and X 1s (q) = X 1s q for states s 2 fH; LH; LLg where:
[ Table 1 here]
In addition, we assume that the government charges deposit insurance premia at time 0 that are based on a risk-neutral valuation of expected guarantee payouts at t = 1 (as it does in practice). Thus, we have X 0 (q) = (1 ) (1 ) m I q. Finally, we assume that debt guarantees may lower output at t = 0 because of moral-hazard related distortions. We capture this by assuming that W 0 (q) = W 0 q where W 0 0.
Numerical solution with risk-averse households and tax distortions
With this microfoundation, we now explore the general case where > 0 and > 0 using numerical solutions. Our key takeaway is that the government's social risk management and …scal risk management motives often pull in opposite directions. Which motive dominates depends on the parameters of the economy and the project.
Parameter Values
[ Table 2 about here] Table 2 lists the baseline parameters underlying our numerical example. At time 0, exogenous private income is Y 0 = 1 and exogenous government spending is G 0 = 0. The parameters governing the probabilities of the three time 1 states are = = 50%. Thus, the H state occurs with probability = 50%. In the H state, there is an economic expansion: private income is Y 1H = 1:2 and government spending is G 1H = 0:1. With probability (1 ) = 25%, the LH state occurs. We interpret the LH state as a moderate recession that leads to a rise in government spending on automatic stabilizer programs. In the LH state, exogenous income is Y 1LH = 0:85, and exogenous government spending is G 1LH = 0:075. Finally, with probability
(1 ) (1 ) = 25%, the LL state occurs. We interpret the LL state as a severe recession that leads to a larger rise in government spending on automatic stabilizer programs. In the LL, Three parameters control household preferences: , , and C. We set = 1, so the riskfree rate would be zero in the absence of risk aversion. We set risk aversion to = 0:25 and C = 1, so that marginal utility equals one when C t = 1 and declines to 0 when C t = 5. Turning to the …scal parameters, we set D = 2=3-a debt-to-GDP ratio of 66:7%-to capture the case where a government faces a high accumulated …scal burden. We set = 0:15. Thus, in the benchmark case where T 0 = T 1 = 0:33, the deadweight marginal cost of public funds is roughly h 0 = 15% 30% = 5%; a conservative assumption relative to estimates in the public …nance literature.
Debt guarantees require no outlays and generate no additional income in the H state at time 1, so X 1H = W 1H = 0. We assume that the gross returns to investment are given by f = 2 and that m I = 0:05. This means that in the LH state at time 1, the program also requires no outlays (X 1LH = 0), but generates additional private income of W 1LH = 0:05. And in the LL state at time 1, the program requires large outlays of X 1LL = 0:05, but generates signi…cant additional private income of W 1LL = 0:1.
Finally, we assume that the government charges insurance premia for the debt guarantee program at time 0 based on a risk-neutral valuation of time 1 guarantee payouts. Thus, the program raises revenue at time 0 equal to X 0 = 25% 0:05 = 0:0125. And, as a reduced form for the moral hazard distortions created by guarantees, we assume the program lowers private income at time 0 by W 0 = 0:0365. Thus, we are assuming that the expected net bene…ts of debt guarantees are quite small:
Baseline Optimal Policies
[ Table 3 about here] Table 3 reports the exact optimal government policies (D 0 ; q) in this example obtained from solving Eqs. (19) and (22) as in Proposition 1, assuming a quadratic utility function of the form Table 4 reports the approximate optimal government policies (D 0 ; q) in this example obtained from solving our system of quadratics given in Eqs. (25) and (27). The approximate solutions in Table 4 are close to the exact solutions in Table 3 . Thus, our discussion focuses on the exact solutions in Table 3 :
Panel A of Table 3 re ‡ecting the fact that marginal utility is expected to decline slightly from time 0 and 1.
Moving across the …rst row, column (2) shows that optimal program scale declines when households are risk neutral: risk-neutral households have a lower willingness to pay for this social hedge. Similarly, program scale rises when there are no tax distortions in column (3).
Finally, q rises in column (4) when risk aversion rises to = 0:50 and q falls in column (5) when tax distortions increase to = 0:175. Taken together, the results in row (1) show that the need to manage …scal risk can signi…cantly reduce the government's ability to manage social risk. Speci…cally, when taxes are distortionary ( > 0), the government should only choose a large amount of a program if it has large net bene…ts in expectation ((
. Put di¤erently, the distortionary costs of taxation argue in favor of …scal conservatism, raising the hurdle that must be cleared before the government undertakes a program designed to correct a market failure.
[ Table 4 about here]
Numerical Comparative Statics The remaining rows in Table 3 show how optimal policy varies with parameters of the background economy and the program. In row (2) In row (5), we increase expected government spending by 0:025 in all states at time However, in our example, the former force outweighs the latter when > 0 and > 0.
In row (6), we increase the volatility of time 1 government spending holding …xed the mean, setting G 1H = 0:125, G 1LH = 0:1, and G 1LL = 0:15. Again, the rise in V ar [G 1 ] works through two competing channels. When households are risk averse, more volatile government spending makes marginal utility more volatile, pushing the government to do more of the program on social risk management grounds. When taxation is distortionary, more volatile government spending increases …scal risk, pushing the government to reduce the scale of the program. In our example, the …rst force outweighs the second when both > 0 and > 0.
In row (7) (8), we increase the variance of the program payo¤s, holding …xed the mean.
Holding …xed marginal utility, the resulting substitution e¤ect makes the program more desirable as a social hedge when households are risk averse. Again, there is a competing income e¤ect because this change lowers expected marginal utility for a given level of q.
In row (9), we increase the expected time 1 program outlays. In our example, the resulting substitution e¤ect dominates, so this change always reduces the optimal program scale. Finally, in row (10), we increase the variance of program outlays, holding …xed the mean, at time 1. The optimal scale of the program falls. Distortionary costs are convex of function of tax revenue, so increasing the variance of taxes raises expected tax distortions, leading the government to reduce the scale of the program. By contrast, as column (3) shows, when there are no tax distortions increasing the variance of program outlays has a negligible e¤ect on program scale.
Overall, Table 3 illustrates how the government's need to manage …scal risk limits its capacity to manage social risk. The table also highlights the fact that the government's social risk and …scal risk management motives often pull in opposite directions as the characteristics of the economy or the government program change.
Portfolios of government programs
We now extend our framework to characterize the optimal portfolio of government programs. The basic trade-o¤s between social and …scal risk management remain but now acquire a portfolio choice ‡avor. Speci…cally, distortionary taxation and household risk aversion create interdependencies amongst otherwise unrelated programs. When taxes are distortionary, the …scal risk of a program depends on the outlays and scale of other programs in the portfolio. Similarly, when households are risk averse, the social risk of a program depends on the net bene…ts and scale of other programs. As a result, programs cannot be evaluated in isolation.
Di¤erent government programs are indexed by j = 1; :::; J; and we let q j denote the chosen scale of program j. For simplicity, we focus on the constant returns to scale case, so that the outlays for program j at time t are q j X tj and the associated social bene…ts are q j W tj . Adopting the vector notation that [q] j =q j , [x t ] j =X tj , and [w t ] j =W tj , the …rst-order condition for the vector of optimal program scales q is
where @R f =@q is the vector analog of Eq. (17). A solution is a tuple (D 0 ; q ) that satis…es Eqs.
(19) and (32) where 0 ; 1 , and R f are implicitly de…ned by the analogs of Eqs. (14) and (16).
To better understand how social and …scal risk create interdependencies amongst programs, we can again approximate the …rst-order condition. In the risk-neutral case where = 0 and > 0, the approximate …rst-order condition for the scale of program j is
In the single-program case studied above, we took other government expenditures G t as given. Now G t is supplemented by the sum of expenditures on other programs in the portfolio, P k q k X tk : Thus, the expected …scal cost and …scal risk of program j depend on the scale of other programs in the government's portfolio. And, crucially, the desire to manage …scal risk means that the government dislikes programs that require large outlays in states where other large-scale programs in the portfolio also require signi…cant outlays.
In the Ricardian case where > 0 and = 0, the approximate …rst-order condition is
Thus, when > 0, the desire to manage social risk means that the government likes programs that deliver large net bene…ts in states where the portfolio of government programs delivers small net bene…ts. The interdependence that arises in the Ricardian limit of our model with risk-averse households is akin to the interdependence recently emphasized by Martin and Pindyck (2015) .
Optimal scale of debt guarantees versus regulation
To illustrate these portfolio intuition, we now study how the optimal mix of debt guarantees and …nancial regulations varies with the extent of tax distortions and the government's preexisting …scal commitments. We assume that both …nancial regulations and debt guarantees may be bene…cial from a …nancial stability standpoint, helping to reduce the likelihood or severity of …nancial crises. However, they may di¤er in how e¤ective they are (i.e., in the social bene…ts they generate in recessions) and how much …scal risk they create.
For simplicity, we work with the risk-neutral case where = 0 and > 0. Without loss of generality, we focus on bene…ts and outlays at time 1; assuming that W 0j = 0 and X 0j = 0 for
To ease notation, we drop the time subscripts so that, for example, X reg denotes outlays associated with the regulatory program and X gtee denotes outlays associated with debt guarantee program at time 1.
We assume that regulation is a …scally safe program in the sense that outlays are constant across the three time 1 states, so V ar [X reg ] = 0. Regulatory outlays can be thought of as the costs of paying regulators and conducting bank examinations. As discussed above, debt guarantees are a …scally risky program so V ar [X gtee ] > 0: the program incurs …scal costs in the severe recession state at time 1. Furthermore, as before, we assume that spending on debt guarantees tends to be high in states where tax rates would otherwise be high, so Cov
Using the approximation in Eq. (33), the optimal program mix satis…es: Proposition 4 Suppose that = 0 and > 0 and that regulation and debt guarantees have the characteristics assumed above. At an optimum where both q reg > 0 and q gtee > 0, we have the following comparative statics:
and
Since taxation is distortionary, raising the correlation between spending on debt guarantees and tax rates, Corr[G T Y Y; X gtee ] makes guarantees less attractive and regulation more attractive. Similarly, an increase in tax distortions always leads to a reduction in the scale of the …scally risky debt guarantee program, @q gtee =@ < 0.
Conclusion
Traditional public …nance models have not fully incorporated the impact of risk management considerations-both social and …scal-on optimal policy. We use insights from the literature on portfolio choice and corporate investment to develop a ‡exible framework for conducting cost-bene…t analysis in a dynamic, stochastic environment.
We highlight the interaction between the government's social and …scal risk management motives. These motives frequently come into con ‡ict because programs with signi…cant social risk management bene…ts often entail large government expenditures and, hence, higher tax distortions in bad times, adding to …scal risk. Neither social risk nor …scal risk can be judged in isolation. For example, a program's …scal risk depends on how its outlays comove with those of other programs. As a result, government cost-bene…t analysis acquires the ‡avor of a classic portfolio choice problem.
A Derivations and proofs
A.1 Derivation of Eq. (12)
We have
The second equality follows from the de…nition: (Net trade govt bonds) t = T t G t X t (q) :
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Di¤erentiation of Eq. (13) and substitution of the e¤ect of changing q on household consumption at times 0 and 1 as:
A.3 Derivation of Eq. (24) To derive Eq. (24), we begin with Eq. (22) in the paper:
denote the representative household's stochastic discount factor and note that R 
The second equality follows from the fact that, for any Z 1 , we have
The third equality follows from the fact that
(note that D 0 @R f =@q is a known constant at t = 0 and does not covary with h 0 ( 1 )) and by rearranging.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Di¤erentiation of Eq. (35).
B Derivation of Approximate Solutions
First, we use a …rst-order Taylor approximation of the marginal deadweight cost of taxation:
Here T and Y are the expansion points for the approximation and h 0 and are constants given below (when = 0 , h 0 = = 0). Thus, the marginal deadweight cost of taxation is approximately linearly increasing in the dollar value of tax revenue T t and approximately linearly decreasing in the dollar value of exogenous output Y t . To derive this approximation note that, since t = (1 p 1 4 T t =Y t )= (2 ), we have 1 2 ), and = (1 2 ) 3 . Next, we approximate consumption using
where and^ Y are constant given below (when = 0,^ Y = 0 ). Again, consumption can be linearly approximated as decreasing in tax revenue T t and increasing in output Y t . To derive this approximation, note that we have
2 and lim !0^ Y = 0. We next approximate households'marginal utility by taking a …rst-order Taylor series approximation about the consumption level C that satis…es u 0 C = 1. Letting u 00 C =u 0 C 0 denote the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion at C t = C, this yields
Thus, households are risk neutral when = 0 and are risk averse when > 0. 15 We restrict attention to parameters where the right-hand side is positive-i.e., whereC t < C + 1 . Finally, we approximate the riskless interest rate as
time 1 tax revenues as T 1 G 1 + X 1 q +R f D 0 , and @R f =@D 0 and @R f =@q using the constants
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Figure 1: Example government program: Bank debt guarantees. The example government program is a bank debt guarantee program that creates financial stability benefits following the arrival of bad news.
Time t = 1/2
Bad news arrives with probability 1-π.
Time t = 0
Banks purchase risky assets and issue risky equity and safe debt-either insured on uninsured-to households If there is bad news, uninsured debt is made safe by liquidating assets at a fire-sale price.
These liquidations lead to costly underinvestment.
Time t = 1
Payoff on risky asset revealed. Payoff on claims issued to households also revealed. 
Good news
Bad news
Insured debt is safe because the government guarantees payment in state LL at time 1.
s = LH
Mild recession, modest asset losses. 
